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The insular cortex has been considered to be the neural base of visceral sensation
for many years. Previous studies in psychology and cognitive neuroscience have
accumulated evidence indicating that interoception is an essential factor in the subjective
feeling of emotion. Recent neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that anterior
insular cortex activation is associated with accessing interoceptive information and
underpinning the subjective experience of emotional state. Only a small number of
studies have focused on the influence of insular damage on emotion processing and
interoceptive awareness. Moreover, disparate hypotheses have been proposed for the
alteration of emotion processing by insular lesions. Some studies show that insular
lesions yield an inability for understanding and representing disgust exclusively, but
other studies suggest that such lesions modulate arousal and valence judgments
for both positive and negative emotions. In this study, we examined the alteration
in emotion recognition in three right insular and adjacent area damaged cases with
well-preserved higher cognitive function. Participants performed an experimental task
using morphed photos that ranged between neutral and emotional facial expressions
(i.e., anger, sadness, disgust, and happiness). Recognition rates of particular emotions
were calculated to measure emotional sensitivity. In addition, they performed heartbeat
perception task for measuring interoceptive accuracy. The cases identified emotions
that have high arousal level (e.g., anger) as less aroused emotions (e.g., sadness) and
a case showed remarkably low interoceptive accuracy. The current results show that
insular lesions lead to attenuated emotional sensitivity across emotions, rather than
category-specific impairments such as to disgust. Despite the small number of cases,
our findings suggest that the insular cortex modulates recognition of emotional saliency
and mediates interoceptive and emotional awareness.
Keywords: insula, interoceptive accuracy, facial expression, arousal level, heartbeat perception task
Introduction
Our emotional experience is well associated with internal bodily change. We have a racing pulse
or sweaty palms when we are excited. The peripheral theory of emotion (James, 1884; Lange,
1885/1992) proposed that “our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.” Although
the theory triggered long discussion, the ﬁndings of recent psychological and brain imaging studies
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have indicated that we refer to our internal bodily state when
we are aware of our emotional state. Additionally, our internal
state modulates our emotional experience (Bechara et al., 1996;
Pollatos et al., 2005; Lane, 2008; Dunn et al., 2010; Terasawa et al.,
2013a,b).
The perception of aﬀerent information arising from anywhere
and everywhere within the body has been termed “interoception”
(Sherrington, 1906; Cameron, 2001). Some methods have been
developed as measurements of an individual’s sensitivity to
perceive interoception, such as the heartbeat perception task
(Schandry, 1981) and water load test (Herbert et al., 2012). Some
questionnaires such as the Autonomic Perception Questionnaire
(Mandler et al., 1958), the Body Perception Questionnaire
(Porges, 1993), and The Multidimensional Assessment of
Interoceptive Awareness (Mehling et al., 2012) are known as
indices of interoceptive sensibility (Garﬁnkel et al., 2015). Some
studies have suggested that sensitivity to interoception represents
the disposition of a person’s emotional experience, such as its
intensity (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2005; Werner
et al., 2009) or the tendency to focus on arousal (Barrett et al.,
2004). Furthermore, a previous study of ours showed that
interoceptive sensitivity predicts sensitivity to the emotions of
others (Terasawa et al., 2014). These ﬁndings indicate that the
way in which interoceptive information is processed can aﬀect
emotional experience in daily life.
Neuroimaging studies also support the notion that
interoceptive sensitivity is closely connected with emotional
experience. Activation of anterior insular cortex is commonly
observed in studies investigating emotional experience or
empathy (Lamm and Singer, 2010; Lee and Siegle, 2012; Gu
et al., 2013). Anterior insular activation is also found when
participants are aware of their internal bodily state (Evans
et al., 2002; Critchley et al., 2004; Hamaguchi et al., 2004).
Our previous study conﬁrmed that both interoceptive and
emotional awareness recruited right anterior insular activation,
and the activation mediated interoception and disposition of
social anxiety (Terasawa et al., 2013b). These ﬁndings support
the hypothesis that the integration of interoception and the
interpretation of environmental information yields the subjective
feeling of emotion and that the insular cortex is one of the critical
regions housing this mechanism.
If interoception plays a role in the foundation of subjective
emotion, what changes can be observed when the insular cortex
is damaged? Case NK had a selective left middle insula lesion
by cerebral infarction and showed diﬃculties in recognizing and
experiencing disgust, even though memory and intelligence were
well preserved (Calder et al., 2000). Several studies support this
ﬁnding (Adolphs et al., 2003; Borg et al., 2013). The origin of
disgust is considered to be a biological signal for preventing
the intake of rotten foods (Susskind et al., 2008). Furthermore,
Penﬁeld found that people felt sensation in their gastrointestinal
organs when electrical stimulation was applied to the insular
cortex during a neurosurgical operation (Penﬁeld and Faulk,
1955). Reported abdominal sensation, pain, and nausea by
stimulation of the insula suggest that the insula plays a key role in
representing interoception. These facts indicate that the insular
cortex is important not only in interoceptive processing, but
also in generating emotional experience that relates to bodily
sensation.
However, the accumulation of neuropsychological studies
on emotional processing revealed that not all areas of the
insular cortex simply subserve the feeling of disgust. A recent
neuropsychological study of 15 insular cortex lesion cases showed
that the ability to recognize fear, happiness, and surprise was
aﬀected, although there was no change in disgust (Boucher
et al., 2015). Adolphs et al. (2000) and Dal Monte et al. (2013)
examined the recognition of six basic emotions in over 100
patients with lesions and identiﬁed several regions that when
damaged led to the decline of emotion recognition performance;
these included the medial prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex,
supramarginal gyrus, and insular cortex. Patients with insular
lesions showed lower performance on discrimination between
negative emotions, rather than a speciﬁc deﬁcit for feeling
disgust.
Recent studies presented ﬁndings those were contrary to
expectations from previous studies. For example, Damasio et al.
(2012) reported the bilateral insular lesion cases showed normal
ability to feel emotion and self-awareness. Furthermore, Couto
et al. (2013) found a minimal impact of insular cortical lesions
when compared subcortical lesion cases. These studies suggest
that the insular cortex is not solely involved in the neural
substrates of emotional awareness, but rather that subcortical
neural networks between the insula and other regions, such as
the thalamus, should be considered. Furthermore, these studies
highlight the importance of accurate documentation of the eﬀects
of insular lesions on emotional recognition ability beyond the
performance of basic emotion category recognition.
A previous study asked patients with insular lesions to evaluate
the arousal level of emotion-inducing pictures and observed
that the patients reported a lower arousal level for the pictures
regardless of valence (Berntson et al., 2011). Because arousal level
and the activity of the sympathetic nervous system are closely
connected, deviation from the homeostatic state of sympathetic
activity and perceiving the deviation can lead to recognition
of the arousal level. The circumplex model of emotion posits
two dimensions for deﬁning emotions, arousal, and valence
(Russell, 1980; Kuppens et al., 2013). Emotions are plotted on
the plane deﬁned by arousal and valence. Sadness, anger, and
disgust are plotted closely to each other on the valence dimension;
however, arousal level is the diﬀerence between these emotions.
The arousal level for anger is the highest, but for sadness it is
the lowest and disgust is in the middle. The insular cortex is
considered to be one neural substrate for representing arousal
level (Lewis et al., 2007), and decreased blood ﬂow in this
region yields blunting of interoception (Khalsa et al., 2009).
These ﬁndings may support the hypotheses that insular cortical
and/or subcortical lesions impair interoception, which underlies
the recognition of arousal level, and leads to lower performance
for discrimination between negative emotions.
On the basis of this hypothesis, we examined the eﬀects on
emotional experience following brain lesions including those in
the right anterior insula cortex. Wemeasured sensitivity to other’s
emotion using morphed continua photos that ranged between
a neutral and an emotional facial expression, and revealed that
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the sensitivity was predicted by the interoceptive accuracy of
individuals (Terasawa et al., 2014). These results may suggest
that emotional experience is aﬀected by the perception of internal
bodily changes triggered by emotional expression. In the present
study, we examined changes in emotional experience in patients
with right anterior insular lesions by the experimental task, and
discuss its inﬂuence on their daily life.
Materials and Methods
The study was performed with the approval of the Keio
University Research Ethics Committee (No. 09006). Before
participating in the study, all cases were informed (1) of the
purpose and procedure of the study and (2) that they were able to
cease their participation in the study at any time. All cases signed
a written informed consent form.
Cases
Three patients with lesions participated the study. They were
outpatients of the neurosurgery department of the Nasu Red
Cross Hospital.
Case A
Case A, a right-handed 61-year-old man, experienced convulsive
seizure by cerebral infarction when he was 59 years old. Right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior insula cortex
were resected by a hematoma evacuation operation (Figure 1A).
The lesion area included the cortical and subcortical anterior
to middle insula and ranged from ventral to dorsal parts.
Three-dimensional magnetic resonance angiography showed no
occlusions of the major cerebral arteries. Case A has a past
history of myocardial infarct, diabetes mellitus, hypertension,
paroxysmal atrial ﬁbrillation, and symptomatic epilepsy. Motor
function, perception, and language abilities are well preserved.
Orientation, memory, working memory, and intelligence are
also preserved, but Perseveration error on the Wisconsin card-
sorting task (WCST) was observed [Category achieved (CA) : 0,
Perseverative errors of the Nelson type (PEN) : 25, Diﬃculties of
maintaining set (DMS) : 0].
Case A reported no change in memory and motor function,
but he described himself as having more impatience and being
duller compared with his premorbid level. He is still working
at a supermarket 5 days a week. According to his family, Case
A became easy to anger, disinhibited, and apathetic. Case A
showed a poor understanding of others’ intentions or facial
expressions. His thermal sensations became dull and he never
felt hot. These reports indicated that even though his memory
ability and intelligence were preserved, Case A had diﬃculty in
controlling his own emotions.
Case B
Case B, a right-handed 45-year-old man, experienced aneurysmal
subarachnoid hemorrhage of the middle cerebral artery when
he was 44 years old. He underwent surgical clipping. Magnetic
resonance imaging showed hemorrhagic contusion of the
temporal pole and decreased cerebral perfusion was observed
FIGURE 1 | Transverse magnetic resonance imaging with FLAIR
acquisition of the brains of the cases. Left sides of images correspond to
the right side of the brain. (A) Case A, (B) Case B, and (C) Case C.
at the right dorsolateral frontal cortex and the anterior insular
cortex (Figure 1B). The lesion area included the cortical and
subcortical anterior to middle insula and ranged from the ventral
to dorsal parts. Motor function, perception, and language abilities
are well preserved. Orientation, memory, working memory,
and intelligence are also preserved, but Perseveration error on
the WCST was observed (CA: 2, PEN: 25, DMS: 1). Lower
performances of verbal ﬂuency test and delayed memory recall
were observed.
Case B reported that he has mellowed and is easily tired.
He never feels anxiety about anything, and cannot understand
people who feel anxiety at all. According to his family and doctor,
Case B shows a poor understanding of others’ facial expressions.
Additionally, he has an attitude of indiﬀerence toward his own
clinical condition. The indiﬀerence may coincide with the lower
anxiety trait.
Case C
Case C, a right-handed 66-year-old man, experienced convulsive
seizure and left hemiparesis when he was 60 years old. Brain
edema of the right frontal white matter was observed by
computed tomography scan. Pathological changes were observed
on the surface of the right frontal and premotor areas, and
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the right frontal lobe including the right anterior insula was
resected (Figure 1C). The lesion area included the cortical and
subcortical anterior insula and ranged from the ventral to dorsal
parts. Then, Case C was diagnosed with oligodendroglioma.
Orientation, memory, working memory and response inhibition,
and sustained attention are preserved, but lower performance on
the WCST (CA: 0, PEN: 21, DMS: 0) and verbal ﬂuency task
were identiﬁed. Motor function, perception, language abilities,
and communication abilities are well preserved. He went back to
his work.
Case C reported that he frequently experienced action slips
and sometimes lost his intention for action. For example, he
required much more eﬀort for concentrating on reading books
compared with symptom onset. However, he and his family
thought this impairment did not signiﬁcantly impact on his daily
life. He had myocardial infarction four times for 4 years since the
neurosurgical procedure. However, he traveled through Japan by
bicycle on his own and also trained for a marathon, regardless of
the heart attack risk. Surprisingly, he reported that he hardly felt
anxious or at risk when performing such an exercise.
Age Matched Healthy Control
Fourteen males (mean age 56.7 ± 3.63 years) participated and
completed the heartbeat perception task and the emotional
sensitivity task. No participants had any psychiatric disorders.
Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) was conducted and
conﬁrmed that their score exceeded 27 points (mean 28.9± 0.95),
indicating no subjects with cognitive impairment.
Materials and Procedures
Heartbeat Perception Task
Only Cases A and C participated the Heartbeat Perception Task.
The task was based on a task developed by Schandry (1981) and
Ehlers and Breuer (1992) for examining interoceptive accuracy.
The task has been used in many previous studies. A detailed
description of the task can be found in our previous study
(Terasawa et al., 2014).
Heartbeats were measured using a pulse oximeter (Polymate
AP1542, TEAC, Tokyo, Japan) on the ﬁngertips during speciﬁc
periods of time. Participants were asked to count the number of
times that they felt their own heartbeat during the measurement
period. Discrepancies between the number of reported and
actual heartbeats during the measurement period were calculated
based on the formula used to deﬁne heartbeat perception error
rates by Ehlers and Breuer (1992): (actual heartbeats – reported
heartbeats/actual heartbeats) × 100. Each case completed six
trials at 35 s× 2, 25 s× 2, and 45 s× 2, with the order randomized
between subjects.
The Time Estimation Task
The time estimation task was developed by Dunn et al. (2010)
to overcome the inﬂuence of time estimation on interoceptive
accuracy. In the task, participants are asked to count the number
of seconds during a given period, and then the reported length
was compared with the actual duration. Time estimation error
rates were calculated in a manner similar to that of the heartbeat
perception error rate and checked whether the error rates for both
task were dissociated. Each case completed six trials at 23 s × 2,
40 s × 2, and 56 s × 2, with the order randomized between
subjects.
Emotional Sensitivity Task
To estimate the emotional sensitivity of the cases, we prepared an
experimental task that was identical to the task used in Terasawa
et al. (2014). A detailed description of the task can be found in
Terasawa et al. (2014). In this task, the cases were presented with
a facial expression photo and were asked whether or not they felt
emotion from the photos, and were asked to report the name of
the emotion if they did feel emotion.
We selected ﬁve photos each of a male individual and
a female individual, with the following facial expressions:
angry, sad, disgust, happiness, and neutral, from the Advanced
Telecommunications Research Institute International Facial
Expression Database (DB99). In addition to the original photos,
morphed photos were prepared for the task. These photos were
made in nine variations, with each variation having diﬀerent
percentages of the neutral and emotion expressions (angry, sad,
disgust, and happiness), ranging from 10% neutral to 100%
of each emotion. For example, Neutral (N) 90% – Happiness
(H):10%, N:80% – H:20%, N:70% – H:30%, N:60% – H:40%,
N:50% – H:50%, N:40% – H:60%, N:30% – H:70%, N:20% –
H:80%, N:10% – H:90%, and N:0% – H:100% (Figure 2A). We
did not use the original neutral picture (N:100% – H:0%) in this
task, as every subject answered that they did not feel emotion
from the picture.
In each trial, (1) a stimulus was presented for 2 s. (2)
Participants were asked whether the stimulus made them feel an
emotion or not. (3) If participants responded “Yes,” then four
options were presented on the screen: anger, sadness, disgust, and
happiness, and they were asked to choose the appropriate one for
the emotion expressed by the stimulus. Because it was important
to determine if the participants felt emotion, we asked them to
respond “Yes” if they actually felt any emotion from the stimulus.
Participants were clearly instructed to categorize emotion that the
model expressed, not the one that they were experiencing. If they
responded “No,” the options did not appear and the task moved
on to the next trial after the presentation of a ﬁxation point for 5 s
(Figure 2B).
Each stimulus was presented ﬁve times in random order, thus
there were 200 trials in total (4 emotion × 10 steps × 5 times).
Original stimuli that fully expressed a certain emotion (e.g., 100%
anger) were labeled as having an “emotion value of 10,” and
neutral stimuli (e.g., 100% neutral) were labeled as having an
“emotion value of 1.” Each step between emotion values 10 and 1,
e.g., from 9 to 2, was labeled depending on the percentage of the
emotional value present in the photo (Figure 2A).
The number of times that participants reported feeling
emotions as a result of viewing each stimulus were calculated. We
classiﬁed those stimuli that made participants feel an appropriate
emotion at least three times out of ﬁve (i.e., at least 60% of
the trials) as having suﬃcient emotional value to produce the
emotional response.
The threshold of emotional value was posited to be located
near the midpoint between stimuli that produced an emotional
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FIGURE 2 | The stimuli used in the task (A) and outline of a trial (B). (A) Morphed continua photos ranging between neutral (stimulus 1) and 100% of each
facial expression (stimulus 10), i.e., angry. (B) A stimulus was followed by a judgment about whether the stimulus elicited an emotion. If participants responded “yes,”
options were presented and they were asked to choose the most appropriate emotion category.
response less than three times and stimuli that produced an
emotional response three times and more. When participants
reported that they felt a certain emotion three times when viewing
a stimulus with an emotion value of six and two times when
viewing the stimulus with an emotion value of 5, we considered
their threshold for emotional response to be 5.5.
Results
Emotional Sensitivity Task
Case A’s responses toward each stimuli and thresholds of
emotional value are shown in Figure 3A. The red arrows show the
place where the thresholds appear. Yellow arrows show averaged
thresholds of the age matched control group. The thresholds are
also shown in Table 1. The responses of Cases B and C are shown
in Figures 3B,C, respectively. As the three ﬁgures and the table
show, all cases needed a higher emotional value to recognize
anger than healthy participants. The same was true for sadness
and disgust. Case C made too many error responses, such as
false identiﬁcation of disgust as sadness or sadness as neutral,
which prevented the deﬁnition of thresholds for disgust and
sadness.
Although the numbers of case and control participants was
small, we compared the thresholds of cases and the control
group statistically. Crawford and Garthwaite (2002) and
Crawford et al. (2010) reported statistical methods to compare
scores of a single case and control group, and provided a
program called Singlims_ES, which can be downloaded from
http://homepages.abdn.ac.uk/j.crawford/pages/dept/Single_Case
_Eﬀect_Sizes.htm. This allowed us to test whether an individuals’
score was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from a control sample. As a
result, the threshold for anger in Cases B and C showed a trend
for being higher than in the control group (t = 1.46, p < 0.10;
Table 1). Case A showed a signiﬁcantly higher threshold for
sadness (t = 1.99, p < 0.05), while Case B showed a higher
threshold for disgust (t = 2.28, p < 0.05). Not all thresholds of
the cases were statistically higher than those of the control group,
although the overall trends were the same, except for happiness.
The results support the idea that that insula lesions do not lead
to impaired recognition of a speciﬁc category of emotion such as
disgust, but rather that sensitivity to emotional value is blunted.
However, the recognition of happy emotions was not aﬀected
by insula lesions because the cases showed similar sensitivity to
happy faces as healthy participants.
The Heartbeat Perception Task
Cases A and C completed the heartbeat perception task and the
time estimation task, but B did not participate in the tasks. The
error rates on the heartbeat perception task were 0.67 (Case A)
and 0.99 (Case C), thus both cases showed very high error rates
on this task. However, remarkably low error rates were observed
on the time estimation task: 0.01 for Case A and 0.06 for Case
C. High error rates on the heartbeat perception task indicate that
lower interoceptive accuracy underlies the blunted sensitivity to
others’ emotion measured by the emotional sensitivity task.
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FIGURE 3 | Numbers of responses for happiness (blue), sadness (red), disgust (green), and anger (purple) for each stimulus. (A) Case A, (B) Case B,
and (C) Case C. Red arrows show the place where the thresholds of cases appeared, and yellow arrows show the averaged thresholds of healthy participants.
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TABLE 1 | Thresholds of emotional value of the cases and healthy
participants.
Threshold t-value p Zcc Control
Case A Anger 4.5 0.68 0.26 0.70 3.64 (1.23)
Disgust 6.5 1.00 0.17 1.03 4.94 (1.51)
Happiness 2.5 −0.55 0.30 −0.57 3.18 (1.20)
Sadness 7.5∗ 1.99 0.03 2.06 4.43 (1.49)
Case B Anger 5.5+ 1.46 0.08 1.51
Disgust 8.5∗ 2.28 0.02 2.36
Happiness 3.5 0.26 0.40 0.27
Sadness 6.5 1.34 0.10 1.39
Case C Anger 5.5+ 1.46 0.08 1.51
Disgust − − − −
Happiness 2.5 −0.55 0.30 −0.57
Sadness − − − −
SD in healthy participants are shown in parentheses. Zcc, effect size for simple
t-test. ∗p < 0.05, +p < 0.10.
The control group also completed the heartbeat perception
task, with a mean error rate of 0.70 ± 0.23. There were no
diﬀerences between Case A compared with control group, while
Case C showed signiﬁcantly lower performance.
Discussion
In this study, we examined the eﬀects on emotional experience
following brain lesions including the right anterior/middle
insula cortex. Findings from the emotional sensitivity task
and the heartbeat perception task indicated that the cases
had blunted sensitivity to emotional expression and lower
interoceptive accuracy. Some previous studies have suggested
that insular lesions lead to selective impairment of disgust
recognition (Calder et al., 2000; Adolphs et al., 2003; Borg
et al., 2013); however, other studies have suggested that such
lesions yield lower performance for discrimination between
negative emotions (Adolphs et al., 2000; Dal Monte et al., 2013).
Furthermore, other studies have proposed reduced arousal to
emotional stimuli regardless of emotional valence (Berntson
et al., 2011).
At the very least, our ﬁndings do not support the hypothesis
positing that insula lesions cause the selective impairment of
disgust recognition. Though Cases A and B needed higher
emotional value to recognize disgust compared with healthy
participants, they could properly recognize disgust when the
stimuli had higher values. Case C could not recognize disgust,
but also sadness, thus the impairment cannot be considered
selective. However, all cases showed some degree of diﬃculty in
recognizing emotions from stimuli.
Unique patterns of error response can be seen when focused
on Figures 3A–C; these are (i) misidentiﬁcation of anger
as disgust or sadness and (ii) misidentiﬁcation of disgust as
sadness. Based on a circumplex theory of emotion and insular
function for recognizing arousal level, these patterns are very
compelling. According to the circumplex theory of emotion
(Russell, 1980), emotions can be plotted on a plane deﬁned by
two dimensions: arousal and valence. Anger, disgust, and sadness
have similar emotional valence, but diﬀerences in arousal level
discriminate these three emotions. Attenuation of recognized
arousal level may lead to the error patterns that can be seen
in the present study, because the arousal level of anger is the
highest, disgust is middle, and sadness is the lowest. As the
insular cortex is related to the recognition of arousal level,
the error patterns may suggest that the cases could understand
the emotional valence of stimuli, but that they had diﬃculty
in sensing arousal level from the stimuli. Thus, they identiﬁed
emotions (e.g., anger) that have high arousal level as less aroused
emotions (e.g., sadness). Arousal level is closely connected to
bodily responses such as cardiovascular activity, respiration, and
body temperature. If interoceptive awareness for these responses
underlies recognition of arousal level, it is reasonable to assume
that insular lesions lead to reduced arousal level, and then to
the altered emotional recognition performance observed in the
present study.
Few previous studies have examined whether insular lesions
lead to a decline in interoceptive accuracy. Khalsa et al. (2009)
revealed that heartbeat sensation was not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
bilateral insular lesion, until an anesthetic was otherwise applied
to the skin. However, Ronchi et al. (2015) reported that resection
of selective right neoplastic insular lesions led to an increment
of error rates on the heartbeat perception task, a result identical
to that of our study. In particular, the resection boosted the
error rates from 0.18 to 0.39. The patient of Ronchi et al. (2015)
had higher interoceptive accuracy before resection, but that was
not the case after resection. We did not measure interoceptive
accuracy of cases prior to the lesion in the present study, and
the heartbeat perception task showed rather large individual
diﬀerences. In fact, although Case C showed remarkably low
performance in the heartbeat perception task, the performance
of Case A was identical to the control group. Thus, the high error
rates of Case C could not be easily attributed to the right anterior
insular lesion. As suggested by Damasio et al. (2012) and Couto
et al. (2013), we considered the function of the insular subcortical
network for the performance. The lesion area of Case A was
rather selective, suggesting that the subcortical network should be
largely preserved. The eﬀect of coexisting somatosensory routes
of interoception should also be considered (Khalsa et al., 2009;
Couto et al., 2014). Findings from a series of previous studies and
our results remain insuﬃcient to fully elucidate the role of the
insula for interoception and emotional awareness. Further testing
of insular lesion cases is required to understand whether insular
lesions lead to a decline in interoceptive accuracy and emotional
awareness.
The reported episodes of the cases’ daily life are also
interesting. None of the three cases had a major problem with
their memory and intelligence, but all reported episodes that
indicate altered emotional experience. An absence of feelings
of anxiety, observed in Cases B and C, is remarkable, because
anxiety is considered to be closely related to interoception and the
insular cortex is one of the neural correlates for this relationship
(Paulus and Stein, 2006; Simmons et al., 2011; Terasawa et al.,
2013a). These studies propose that ampliﬁed sensitivity to
bodily information enables us to detect subtle internal bodily
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changes and evokes anxiety, because anxiety states are closely
related to sympathetic activities. If the exaggerated attention to
interoceptive information is assumed to yield anxious feelings,
then conversely the unavailability of interoceptive information
may reduce anxiety.
However, there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
cases and healthy participants for the thresholds of emotional
value for happiness. If attenuated interoceptive accuracy lowers
arousal level, this trend should also be observed for happiness
recognition. We posit three possible reasons for this ﬁnding.
The ﬁrst hypothesis is that the right insula speciﬁcally underlies
negative emotion processing, not that for positive emotion. Craig
(2005) suggested this asymmetrical function of the insula, and
proposed associations of the right anterior insula with energy
expenditure (arousal) feelings, such as risk and depression,
and the left insula with energy enrichment (aﬃliation) feelings,
such as social bonding. His suggestion may support the notion
that positive emotion is related to left insular activity rather
than the right insula. However, some studies have reported
that highly aroused emotions recruit anterior insula activity
regardless of valence (Iaria et al., 2008; Moriguchi et al., 2014).
These studies imply that the laterality of insular function is
still controversial, and this idea seems insuﬃcient for explaining
our ﬁndings about happiness. The second hypothesis is that
people have a tendency to process happy faces preferentially
more than other emotions. Calvo and Nummenmaa (2008)
observed that happy faces need less time to be detected
precisely compared with fearful, angry, sad, surprised, and
disgusted faces. The ﬁndings suggest that sensitivity to happy
faces predominates over the blunting of emotion recognition
based on the insula lesion, thus recognition of happy emotions
was maintained. The third hypothesis concerns a technical
issue, that there is only one option for positive valence
emotion. If cases could understand valence properly, there is
no possibility to misidentify happy as other emotions, but
the possibilities were high for negative emotions, because
there are three options for negative emotions. Our results are
not detailed enough to decide which is the most plausible
hypothesis, but the ﬁndings suggest that the cases could
understand emotional valence properly and that the eﬀect of
interoception would be rather small on recognition of the
valence.
All three cases showed lower performance in the WCST, and
the number of perseveration error responses was quite high in
particular. Neuroimaging studies designate the involvement of
the insula cortex in various cognitive functions such as attention
or memory, thus it is possible to posit that insula lesions
aﬀected performance through basic cognitive functions (Kurth
et al., 2010). However, we need to note that the cases’ lesions
extended to the right DLPFC, which is well known for neural
correlates for executing the WCST (Buchsbaum et al., 2005;
Lie et al., 2006). The eﬀects of the cases’ DLPFC lesions would
be to induce lower performance on the WCST. Since DLPFC
is known as an important region for appraisal or regulation
processes of emotion, we should consider possibility that the
DLPFC lesion may aﬀect the performance of the emotional
sensitivity task. Recent neuropsychological study (Jenkins et al.,
2014) which used morphed expression photos showed the eﬀect
of DLPFC lesion on recognition of emotional expression was
restricted. Though the eﬀect of DLPFC lesion on the emotional
sensitivity task would be limited, further careful investigations
should be conducted to clarify the possible sole eﬀect of DLPFC
lesion.
Thus, extended lesion areas in the cases prevent us from
concluding that the ﬁndings originated from the insular lesion
selectively, which is a limitation of the present study. Future
studies with more selective insula lesion cases are required.
Recent reports suggest that the insular cortex can be divided
into anterior/middle/posterior and ventral/dorsal regions, with
diﬀering cognitive functions in these regions. For example,
Kurth et al. (2010) suggested that the ventral region was
important for social-emotional function, the anterior dorsal
region for cognitive function, and the medial to posterior
regions for sensorimotor function. However, it was also reported
that interoceptive processing is reliant on the posterior region,
while exteroceptive processing relies on the anterior region
(Farb et al., 2013). These inconsistent ﬁndings suggest that
further neuropsychological studies focusing on the lesion area
in the insula and its impact on cognitive function are required.
Unfortunately, the lesion areas of the three cases in the present
study were not restricted to a particular region.
Despite the small number of cases, our ﬁndings suggest that
perceiving interoceptive information may modulate the contents
of emotional experience, and the notion is consistent with
some previous ﬁndings. In the future, studies with more lesion
cases will be beneﬁcial for understanding the causality between
interoception and subjective emotion through neural substrates.
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